ECE 382N-Sec (FA25):

L1: Cache-Based Covert/Side Channels

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Previously on ECE 382N: Sharing Resource => Side Channel



*Characters are based on https://xkcd.com/2176 and https://xkcd.com/1808 (under a CC Attribution-NonCommercial 2.5 License)

Why Cache?

Many cache and cache-like resources => large attack surface



Previously on ECE 382N: Side Channels vs. Covert Channels

Side Channel



Victim is not cooperating, the leakage is incidental

Covert Channel



Victim/sender is colluding

A covert channel is more capable than a side channel. Side-channel attacks often start with building a covert channel

Flush+Reload: Leveraging "Cache Flush" Instructions



- CPUs often provide instructions to flush a cache line at given virtual address from **every level of the cache hierarchy**
  - Invalidate the cache line
  - Write back its data if it's modified
- Examples:
  - x86: `CLFLUSH <vaddr>`
  - ARM: `DC CIVAC <vaddr>` (Data or unified Cache line Clean and Invalidate by VA to PoC)
- Why?
  - Maintaining Coherence with Cached Memory-Mapped IO[1]
  - Push modified data to non-volatile memory for crash recovery

[1]https://sites.utexas.edu/jdm4372/2013/05/30/coherence-with-cached-memory-mapped-io/ by John D McCalpin (TACC)

Flush+Reload Covert Channel Setup



Setup:

- Sender and receiver processes run on the same host (**co-location**)
- Both processes cannot communicate with each other
- There are **read-only** memory pages shared between these two processes

Goal: Covertly transmit information from the sender to the receiver, bypassing the communication restrictions

RO Data Shared memory page (read-only)

Flush+Reload Covert Channel Timeline



Send "1"

Receiver: Flush

RO Data Shared memory page (read-only)

Flush+Reload Covert Channel Timeline





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Flush+Reload Covert Channel Timeline





Flush+Reload Covert Channel Timeline





Important! The information is encoded as whether the share cache line is cached
Flush+Reload works regardless of the actual cache line data

Flush+Reload Covert Channel (Multi-Bit)



Why do Sender and Receiver Share Memory Pages?

Reason 1: Page cache



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Reason 1: Page cache



Note: Page cache, by itself, creates a side channel
See “Page Cache Attacks” by Gruss et al. (CCS ’19)

Why do Sender and Receiver Share Memory Pages?

Reason 2: Memory Deduplication



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

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Reason 2: Memory Deduplication



Note: Memory deduplication, by itself, creates a (remote) side channel
See “Remote Memory-Deduplication Attacks” by Schwarzl et al. (NDSS ’22)

Covert Channel Demo

Tools and shortcuts:

- Inline assembly: https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Extended-Asm.html
- High-resolution timer on x86:
  - Timestamp counter (TSC)
  - Synchronized across all cores
  - Accessible via `rdtsc` and `rdtscp`, no root privileged required
  - Useful for measuring latency and synchronization

Sender-Receiver Synchronization Protocol



Covert Channel Demo

Try it yourself:

- Code repo: https://github.com/ece382n-sec/Example-PoCs
- ECE-LRC has the perfect machines to try it
  - Access to ECE LRC: https://cloud.wikis.utexas.edu/wiki/spaces/eceit/pages/37752870/ECE+Linux+Application+Servers

- Change existing code and see what happens (and understand why)
- Try to re-implement it based on your own understanding

Why Covert Channels?



From Covert Channel to Side Channel

Square-and-Multiply Exponentiation (Used in RSA)

Inputs:

- b: base
- m: modulo
- e: exponent (secret!)
- n: the bit width of e

Output:

$b^e \bmod m$

```
def expMod(b, m, e, n):
  r = 1
  for i in n-1...0:
    r = square(r, r)
    r = reduce(r, m)
    if get_bit(e, i) == 1:
      r = multiply(r, b)
      r = reduce(r, m)
  return r
```



Flush+Reload monitors which function is called and when

Flush+Reload Trace for Square-and-Multiply (From Yarom et al.)



One time slot = 2500 cycles

What If We Cannot Flush... => Evict+Reload

Why?:

- No CLFLUSH in browser's JavaScript runtime
- Arm's "DC CIVAC <vaddr>" can be disabled in the userspace (EL0)

Workaround: Cache has a limited capacity => evict the target cache line

Eviction set: A set of cache lines, once accessed, evict the target cache line

A trivial eviction set: A large memory buffer that thrashes the entire cache

What We Want is a Minimal Eviction Set



Mapping Addresses to Cache Sets



Mapping Addresses to Cache Sets

Attacker cannot force a VA to be mapped to a specific cache set



Constructing an Eviction Set



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

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

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

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

Test Eviction is Susceptible to Noise



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

Note: Developing eviction set construction algorithms that are resilient to noise is a very good term project direction

A More Efficient Algorithm of Constructing an Eviction Set



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

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

Note: Developing algorithms that can efficiently construct eviction sets, especially in a noisy environment, has been a popular research topic (and a great term project)

Evict+Reload Timeline



Prime+Probe: Monitor Memory Accesses to a Cache Set

Victim/Sender

Attacker/Receiver



4-way set-associative
last-level cache (LLC)

Prime+Probe: Monitor Memory Accesses to a Cache Set

Victim/Sender

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

Probe

Cache hit!
Low latency

4-way set-associative
last-level cache (LLC)

Prime+Probe: Monitor Memory Accesses to a Cache Set



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

4-way set-associative
last-level cache (LLC)

Prime

Blind spot!

Cannot detect any access occurs during priming

Prime+Probe Timeline



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

Note: Developing fast prime and probe operations is also a popular research topic (and a great term project)

Compared to Flush+Reload/Evict+Reload

- **Different leakage mechanism**
  - Flush+Reload (F+R)/Evict+Reload (E+R) => Cache reuse
  - Prime+Probe (P+P) => Cache contention
- **Pro:** P+P does not need shared pages between the attack and victim
  - This is very important because cloud vendors generally prohibit different tenants from sharing pages
  - See: "The Security Design of the AWS Nitro System" from AWS, chapter "The EC2 approach to preventing side-channels"
- **Con:** P+P is more coarse grained
  - If the victim accesses two different cache lines mapped to the same cache set
    - P+P cannot distinguish which line is accessed
    - But F+R and E+R can

Prime+Probe Trace for Square-and-Multiply (From Yan et al.[1])



Victim executes “multiply” => Longer probe latency

[1]Yan et al. “Attack Directories, Not Caches: Side Channel Attacks in a Non-Inclusive World”

Next Lecture: Side Channels in Public Clouds



A Few Announcements and Reminders

- Our first paper review due this Sunday
  - Review guidelines and examples posted on Canvas
- Please form groups for the term project (due today)
- Please sign up for the presentation slots (due this Sunday)
  - **Signing up for the early-bird slots (i.e., the four Sep slots) gives you 5 bonus points**